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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion to set aside 
a default judgment (R-82) entered by the Honorable Robert C. Gibson, judge of the 
Fifth Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, Salt Lake Department 
(default judgment was entered as a result of defendant's failure to appear for the 
trial). Judge Gibson specifically ruled that defendant had failed to use due 
diligence prior to the trial and that there was no excusable neglect which would 
excuse him from appearing at the time and place set for the trial. 
Jurisdiction is based on Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals (hereinafter referred to as R.U.C.A.) and on 78-4-11, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended. 
ii 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
(a) WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO 
SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHERE DEFENDANT 
INEXCUSABLY FAILED TO APPEAR FOR THE TRIAL. 
(b) WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHOUT TAKING TESTIMONY FROM 
THE PLAINTIFF. 
RULES 
Rules 55 and 60 are set out in full in the Addendum. 
i i i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, disposition below. This 
action was commenced October 27, 1986, by service of summons upon the 
defendant (R-5), and involves a dispute over services as a private detective 
allegedly rendered by the defendant for the plaintiff as set forth in plaintiff's 
complaint (R 1-2). 
Defendant answered the complaint pro se (R 7-8), responded initially to 
plaintiff's discovery pro se (R 24-30), and ultimately responded with assistance of 
counsel (R 40-45). Counsel then withdrew (R 48). Plaintiff notified defendant to 
appoint counsel (R 49), and defendant proceeded thereafter pro se. Notice of trial 
was mailed to the defendant November 20, 1986, by the clerk of the court (R 51), 
noticing the trial for 9:30 a.m., January 5, 1987. 
The case was called for trial by the Court on January 5, shortly after 
9:30 a.m. No one appeared for the defendant. The undersigned appeared as 
attorney for the plaintiff, advised the Court that he had no witnesses, moved the 
Court for an order striking the answer of the defendant, entering his default, and 
entering judgment against the defendant pursuant to the prayer of the complaint. 
Judge Gibson took the motion under advisement and requested counsel to submit 
some authority for the proposition that he could enter default judgment without 
proof from the plaintiff where the defendant had answered and the case was at 
issue at the time of trial (R 52-53, 64, 73-74). 
Plaintiff filed the requested memorandum January 26, 1987, with Judge 
Gibson (R 52-54), discussed the contents thereof with the Court, and the Court 
thereupon entered default judgment as prayed (R 60-61). 
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Defendant, thereafter made timely motion to vacate the default 
judgment (R 62-63), supported by his affidavit (R 65-66). The undersigned filed an 
affidavit in opposition (R 73-75), and the motion was argued March 18 (R 82). It 
was denied upon the ground that defendant had failed to exercise due diligence 
prior to the trial, and that there was no excusable neglect that would excuse him 
from attending the trial (R 82). Defendant filed his notice of appeal March 19 (R 
84), 12 days before entry of the order appealed from on March 31 (R 82). 
Statement of Additional Facts. In addition to the facts set forth in the 
foregoing discussion of the nature, course and disposition of the case, the following 
facts are significant: 
1. All pleadings filed by the defendant prior to the appearance of 
Randy Ludlow as his counsel, listed his address as 5564 West Jeremiah Drive, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84118 (R 7, 24, 26). The summons was served upon him at that 
address (R 6) and the complaint mailed to him at that address (R 2). 
2. Discovery, notices and correspondence mailed by the undersigned 
were directed to defendant at 5564 West Jeremiah Drive (R 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 
23, 33, 34 and 36). 
3. A supplemental order was served upon defendant at that address (R 
47), as was the notice to appoint counsel (R 49) and the request for trial setting (R 
50). There is nothing in the file to indicate that any of them were not received by 
the defendant. 
4. Notice of Trial was sent to the defendant at the said address giving 
him just over six weeks advance notice. 
5. Defendant's pro se motion to set aside the default judgment, once 
again, listed his address as 5564 West Jeremiah Drive. 
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6. Except for the unsworn representations in defendant's motion to 
vacate the default judgment (R 62), the only thing in the record purporting to 
excuse the defendant from appearing at the trial is the statement contained as 
paragraph 3 of the affidavit of M. Chris Harrison (R 65-66) which states: "That the 
notice of trial in the above entitled matter was inadequate, and that defendant 
received said notice by telephone from his daughter". 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
All pleadings in the file, either those sent by the plaintiff or those 
received from the defendant, list defendant's address as 5564 West Jeremiah Drive, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Since defendant himself supplied the address, it is presumed 
to be the address to which notice should be sent until such time as defendant 
notifies the court and counsel to the contrary. 
Notice of the trial was mailed to defendant at the Jeremiah Drive 
address, by the clerk of the court over six weeks prior to the time scheduled for 
trial. Defendant received that notice and also was additionally notified by his 
daughter at some unspecified time. 
Defendant failed to show due diligence and/or that he was prevented 
from appearing at the trial by circumstances over which he had no control. 
The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in 
granting or denying a motion to vacate, and will be reversed by the Appellate 
Court only where an abuse of discretion is clearly established. 
Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that even the clerk of 
the court may enter a default judgment for a sum certain (as in this case), once the 
default of the defendant has been entered. The court entered the defendant's 
default when he failed to appear for trial. Plaintiff applied to the court, and the 
court, as it is permitted to do by Rule 55, determined that it was not necessary to 
take testimony on the sum certain before entering judgment by default. 
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The appeal of the plaintiff is frivolous and plaintiff should be awarded 
double costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33 R.U.C.A. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CIRCUIT COURT DID NOT ERR BY REFUSING 
TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHERE DEFENDANT 
INEXCUSABLY FAILED TO APPEAR FOR THE TRIAL 
Applicable facts. Without restating the facts in detail, the following 
series of facts and events are controlling: (a) Summons was served on the 
defendant at 5564 West Jeremiah Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the complaint 
was mailed to him at that address, (b) Defendant answered the complaint, pro se, 
and listed his address as 5564 West Jeremiah Drive, (c) Discovery was mailed to 
him at the Jeremiah Drive address and he responded, pro se, listing, once again, his 
address as the Jeremiah Drive address, (d) The only address on any of the 
pleadings filed by defendant (except for those filed by his attorney) list 5564 West 
Jeremiah Drive as his address, (e) There is nothing in the record to support the 
contention made by the defendant in his brief that his daughter is a teenager, or 
that he only received notice of the trial from her by telephone on the day of the 
trial, (f) To the contrary, all indications are that he actually received all 
pleadings and correspondence in a timely manner• For instance, the complaint was 
mailed to him October 30, 1984, and he filed his answer only 14 days later on 
November 13. (g) The notice of trial was mailed to defendant at the Jeremiah 
Drive address November 20, 1986, giving him just over six weeks advance notice. 
(h) The only thing in the record purporting to excuse defendant from appearing at 
the trial is the statement contained in his affidavit (paragraph 3) wherein he states 
"that a notice of trial in the above entitled matter was inadequate, and that the 
defendant received said notice by telephone from his daugher". Note that nothing 
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is said about when he received either the written notice or the telephone call from 
his daughter. 
Due diligence and excusable neglect. While it is true, as stated in 
defendant's brief that ". . . it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion 
to refuse to vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or 
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set 
it aside", Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 U.2d. 52, 376 P.2d. 951 (1962), and 
that the remedy should be liberally administered in order to grant the defaulting 
party his day in court, Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U. 416, 260 P.2d. 741 
(1953), it is likewise beyond dispute that such policy coexists with the broad 
latitude of discretion accorded the trial court in ruling upon such motions. See 
Warren vs. Dixon Ranch (supra), and Board of Education of Granite School District 
vs. Cox, 14 U.2d. 385, 384 P.2d. 806 (1963). In fact, the implementation of the 
policy has been specifically committed to the trial court as follows: 
"The trial court is endowed with considerable latitude of dis-
cretion in granting or denying a motion to relieve a party from a 
final judment under Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and this court will reverse the trial court only where an abuse of 
discretion is clearly established . . . the rule that the courts will 
incline toward granting relief to a party, who has not had the 
opportunity to present his case, is ordinarily applied at the trial 
court level, and this court will not reverse the determination of 
the trial court merely because the motion could have been 
granted." Airkem Intermountain Inc. vs. Parker, 30 U.2d. 65, 513 
P.2d. 429 (1973), emphasis added. 
Justice Hall, in his vigorous dissent in the matter of Interstate 
Excavating, Inc., vs. Agla Development Corporation, 611 P.2d. 369 (1980), observed 
that such discretion accorded the trial court has been given the "widest berth" by 
reviewing courts relative to motions to vacate judgments which are based on 
allegations of mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect. He reminds us that a 
determination at the trial court level that a given course of conduct did not 
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constitute mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect sufficient to justify relief 
from a default judgment will, therefor, be disturbed on appeal "only in the presence 
of a manifest abuse of discretion". See 611 P.2d. at 372. He further reminds us 
that excusable neglect must occur despite the exercise of due diligence, that it 
must have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circum-
stances, that simple carelessness will not qualify, nor will simple business diffi-
culties which allegedly prevent the dedication of adequate attention to the 
litigation in question. 
The case of Heath vs. Mower, 597 P.2d. 855 (1979) seems to say it all. 
In that case, defendant failed to respond to the complaint and his default was 
entered. Upon motion it was vacated and plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to 
which defendant responded. Notice of pre-trial was sent to defendant at various 
known addresses. Defendant did not show up for the pre-trial, but allegedly sent a 
mailgram to the court stating that he would be unable to attend, was looking for a 
local attorney to handle the matter, and asked how he should proceed from that 
point on. The mailgram did not arrive at the clerk's office until 4 days after the 
pre-trial hearing. At the hearing, the Court entered defendant's default and 
entered judgment pursuant to the prayer of the complaint. 
Thereafter he obtained the services of an attorney who promptly moved 
to vacate the judgment. Accompanying the motion was Mower's affidavit stating, 
among other things, that he had never received the certified notice mailed by 
plaintiffs counsel (and which he had refused to claim). He pointedly made no 
mention of the notice mailed by the clerk of the court and claimed that he had 
"become aware" of the pre-trial hearing, 2 days before it was scheduled, through a 
telephone conversation with his wife (a co-defendant). The trial court denied the 
motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that Mower knew about the pre-
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trial date and that he had received timely notice. Mower claimed that he had been 
given insufficient notice of the pre-trial hearing (does that remind one of anything 
alleged by the defendant in the instant case?) and cited several cases standing for 
the proposition that the court should favor granting relief from a default judgment 
whenever there is reasonable excuse and it would not result in substantial prejudice 
or injustice to the adverse party. Justice Stewart, writing the unanimous decision 
said: 
"While we agree that trial courts should be generally indulgent 
toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they 
can be settled advisedly and in conformity with law and justice 
(citing Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite Co., supra), each case must, 
nevertheless, depend upon its own peculiar facts and circum-
stances. fNo general rule can be laid down respecting the 
discretion to be exercised in setting aside or refusing to set aside a 
judgment by default.1 " Page 858. 
Justice Stewart went on to say: 
"The rule that the courts will incline towards granting relief to 
a party who has not had the opportunity to present his case, is 
ordinarily applied at the trial court level, and this court will not 
reverse the determination of the trial court merely because the 
motion could have been granted." Emphasis added. 
Referring to Airkem Intermountain, Inc. vs. Parker, 30 U.2d. at 68, 513 P.2d. at 
431, he said: 
" . . . a party trying to set aside a default judgment 'must show 
that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from 
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.1 " 
See also Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., supra, also stating that movant 
must have exercised due diligence. 
Application to defendant. Movant's only excuse for failing to appear at 
the trial was that the notice was allegedly "inadequate" and that he received notice 
by telephone from his daughter. Nothing is said about why the notice was 
inadequate, nor what effect notice from his daughter purportedly had. There is a 
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complete dearth of information concerning due diligence of the defendant prior to 
the trial, why he could not attend at the appointed time, what efforts he made to 
notify the court or counsel of any change of address or to assure that he would get 
notices in the future, when he received the notice in the mail, when he received 
the telephone call from his daughter, where he was at the time, what efforts he 
made to notify the court or counsel that he would be late or could not attend, and 
etc. Is it any wonder that the trial judge concluded that defendant had not 
exercised due diligence prior to the trial and that there was no excusable neglect 
excusing him from appearing at the trial? There is no manifest abuse of discretion 
shown and the decision of the trial court should be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE CIRCUIT COURT ACTED PROPERLY BY GRANTING 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHOUT TAKING TESTIMONY 
FROM THE PLAINTIFF 
Applicable facts. The case was called for trial by the court shortly 
after 9:30 on the 5th of January, 1987. No one appeared on behalf of the 
defendant. The undersigned appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, advised the court 
that he did not have any witnesses present and moved the court for an order 
striking the answer of the defendant, entering his default, and entering judgment 
against the defendant pursuant to the prayer of the complaint. The Court took the 
matter under advisement and requested counsel to submit some authority for the 
proposition that he could enter default judgment without proof by the plaintiff 
where the defendant had answered and case was at issue. The requested 
memorandum was submitted to the court on January 26 and judgment entered 
accordingly. See above statement of the case for citations to the record. 
Post Hearing Contacts with Court. Defendant attempts to make 
something improper out of the submission of the memorandum and discussion with 
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the Court (as requested by the Court) without further notice to him (the defendant) 
who was in default. The memorandum and discussion with the Court was, in 
reality, a continuation of the discussion had between counsel and the court on the 
5th at the time of trial. It is clear that there was no obligation, nor even 
expectation, of counsel or the Court to notify defendant thereof. Rule 55(a)(2), 
U.R.C.P. provides that after the entry of default, there is no need to notify 
defendant of any other action to be taken, nor to serve any notice or pleading on 
him thereafter, except pleadings asserting new or different matters, and notice of 
entry of judgment (which was done in this case). 
Effect of Rule 55. Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that "When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules . . . the clerk shall 
enter his default." (Emphasis added). Although defendant did plead, he has not 
"otherwise defended" by virtue of his failure to appear for the trial. The writer 
was not able to find any Utah cases directly on point. The Supreme Court of the 
State of Montana, however, has spoken clearly on this issue. In the case of Archer 
vs. LaMarch Creek Ranch (1977), 571 P.2d. 379, the defendant had denied the 
allegations of the complaint and had raised certain affirmative defenses in his 
answer. He failed to appear at the trial, however, and the plaintiff moved the 
court for default judgment. The trial court granted the motion and entered default 
judgment against the defendant, who subsequently appealed, on the ground (among 
others) that the trial court could not enter judgment upon motion of the plaintiff 
where no proof was offered to contravert the allegations of the answer (including 
the affirmative defenses). The Supreme Court, citing Rule 55 of the Montana 
Rules of Civil Procedure said that since no one appeared on behalf of the defendant 
at the trial, the defendant had thereby failed to "otherwise defend" and "the 
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District Court had no alternative but to grant plaintiff's motion for default 
judgment". Emphasis added. See page 382. 
The earliest reported case that the undersigned was able to find in 
support of the proposition that the Court should enter default judgment against the 
defendant when he fails to appear at the trial was a reference to a Kentucky case, 
Schooler vs. Asherst, 11 Ky (1 Litt) 216. 
There is nothing in Rule 55 which requires the Court to take testimony, 
particularly where the amount sought is for a sum certain, as in this case. 
According to the Rule, once the default had been entered (by the Court), even the 
Clerk of the Court could enter the judgment for the pleaded sum certain. The Rule 
provides that judgment may be entered as follows: 
"(1) By the Clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against the 
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by 
computation be made certain, . . . the clerk upon request of the 
plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs 
against the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to 
appear . . . 
"(2) By the Court. In all other cases the party entitled to a 
judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order 
to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it 
is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of 
damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or 
to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may 
conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems 
necessary and proper." Emphasis added. 
It is apparent that the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain, that even 
the Clerk could have entered the judgment after the Court had entered the default, 
that plaintiff did, in fact, apply to the Court for judgment, and that the Court did 
not deem it necessary for the plaintiff to present evidence on the balance due, or 
otherwise. All of which procedure is clearly within the scope of the spirit and the 
letter of Rule 55. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant clearly failed to establish that he had used due diligence and 
that he should be excused for failure to appear at the trial due to circumstances 
over which he had no control. Notice of the trial was sent to him (at the address 
which he had provided the court) over six weeks prior to the time set for trial. He 
makes no claim that he did not receive it, but attempts to excuse himself on the 
ground that his daughter (also?) notified him by telephone at some unstated time 
and without any explanation as to why, in fact, he could not attend the trial at the 
designated time. 
Neither Rule 55 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, nor any other Rule, 
prohibits the entry of default judgment, without evidence, where the amount 
claimed is for a sum certain, as was the claim in the instant case. Even so, the 
court may enter default judgment upon application of the plaintiff and may take 
testimony if it deems it necessary. Obviously it was not necessary in this case. 
Plaintiff urges this Court to uphold the decision of the trial court and 
sustain the entry of judgment by default. 
Plaintiff further requests that the Court make a determination under 
Rule 33 R.U.C.A., that the appeal of the defendant is frivolous and/or for the 
purpose of delay, and award double costs, including a reasonable attorney fee to 
plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of July, 1987. 
/ * / 
Robert L. Lord 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
11 
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Rule 55. Default 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative 
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by 
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his 
default 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any 
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be neces-
sary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken 
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule 
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the 
nondefaultmg party 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for 
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served otherwise than by publica-
tion or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of 
the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs against 
the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is 
not an infant or incompetent person 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by 
default shall apply to the court therefor If, in older to enable the court to 
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account 
or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any 
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, 
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems 
necessary and proper 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b) 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this 
rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, 
a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counter-
claim In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 
54(c) 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judg-
ment by default shall be entered against the State of Utah or against an 
officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to 
relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Addendum " A " 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes* Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (l)mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
<4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendanthas 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
lain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Addendum " B " 
Circuit Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL WILLIAMS 
Plantiff(s) 
VS. 
M. CHRIS HARRISON 
NOTICE OF TRIAL 
P A S B M H 84 CV 10295 
JUDGE GIBSON 
Defendant(s) 
TO Robe r t L. Lord 
TO M. C h r i s H a r r i s o n 
ATTORNEY FOR 
P r o - S e 
. PLANTIFF 
.DEFENDANT 
You and each of you will please take notice that the above entitled case is set for 
trial in said court at 9 : 5 ° o'clock A - M., on the 5 t h day of J a n u a r y
 119 J£7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that 1 mailed a copy of the above notice of trial on this 20 th day of November
 119.86.; to: 
R o b e r t L. Lord M. C h r i s H a r r i s o n 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 5564 W. J e r e m i a h D r i v e 
431 Sou th 500 E a s t , S u i t e 444 
S a l t Lake C i t y . Utah 84111 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84118 
PAUL L. VANCE 
CLERK, CIRCUIT COURT 
By: 
!**«? * *> "* *\vk 
Addendum n C • 
FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT - SLC. 
Case : 845102950 CV Civil 
Case Title: 
WILLIAMS MICHAEL VS HARRISON M CHRIS 
WEDNESDAY JANUARY 7, 1937 
9:48 AM 
Filing Date: 11/01/84 
Cause of Action: 
Amount of Suit.: $. 00 
Return Date,...: 
Judgment : Date: Amt: $. 00 
Disposition..••: Date: 
Court Set: TRIAL on 01/05/87 at 0930 A in room ? with RCG 
No Tracking Activity, 
No Accounts Payable Activity. 
Party..: PLA Plaintiff 
Name...: 
WILLIAMS MICHAEL 
Home Phone.: ( ) Work Phone.: ( ) 
Party..: DEF Defendant 
Name... : 
HARRISON M CHRIS 
Home Phone.: ( ) Work Phone.: ( ) 
J2/25/86 Case converted from SLC system... Civil file date 11/01/84. SLC 
I 10/17/86 FILED NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL (DEFENDANT) MRS 
I 10/27/86 FILED NOTICE TO APPEAR IN PERSON OR APPOINT OTHER COUNSEL MRS 
I 11/05/86 FILED REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING NMD 
11/18/86 TRL scheduled for 1/ 5/87 at 9:30 A in room ? with RCG NMD 
01/05/87 GIBSON/CKO T870002 C44 PLAINTIFF PRESENT THRU ATTY ROBERT LORD. CKO 
DEFENDANT NOT PRESENT. PLAINTIFF NOT PREPARED WITH EVIDENCE. CKO 
I PLAINTIFFS ATTY MOTION FOR JUDGMENT C/0 MOTION DENIED CKO 
End of the docket report for this case. 
Addendum n D w 
ROBERT L. LORD 
Utah State Bar No- 1994 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
444 Metropolitan Law Building 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4241 
m THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNT* OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, ) 
. . . Plaintiff, ) JUDGMENTBY DEFAULT 
vs. ) Civil No. 84-CV-10295 
M. CHRIS HARRISON, ) 
• . . Defendant. ) 
—oooOooo— 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial before the 
undersigned, one of the judges of the above entitled court, on the 5th day of 
January, 1987, at the hour of 9:30 a.m. Plaintiff appeared by and through his 
attorney, Robert L. Lord. No one appeared on behalf of the defendant, whereupon 
counsel for the plaintiff moved for judgment pursuant to the prayer of the 
complaint on file herein. 
The Court, having considered the motion of the plaintiff, together with 
the memorandum in support thereof, having examined the files and records herein, 
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, hereby finds that the 
plaintiff is entitled to a return of the $2,100 advance fees paid to the defendant for 
failure of the defendant to provide services as agreed. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises 
aforesaid, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said plaintiff do 
have and recover from the defendant, the sum of $2,100, interest thereon at the 
rate of 10% per annum from December 15, 1983, in the sum of $647.50, together 
with plaintiff's costs and disbursement incurred in this action amounting to the sum 
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of $30.00, making a total judgment of $2,777.50, all to bear interest at the rate 
of 12% per annum from the date hereof till paid. 
DATED this <?/, day of January 1987. 
BY THE COU1 
RoberVaudibson 
Circuit Court Judge 
Addendum n E-l n 
M. CHRTS HARRISON 
Pro Se 
5564 West Jeremiah Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone? (801) 482-4151 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
M. CHRIS HARRISON, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
/' MOTION T0 SET 
Sr*STI^T)EFAULT 
, AND 
HEARING 
•10295 
COMES NOW t h e D e f e n d a n t , M. C h r i s H a r r i s o n , P r o S e , 
and m o v e s t h i s C o u r t f o r an O r d e r s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e D e f a u l t 
J u d g m e n t e n t e r e d by t h i s Cour t in f avor of t h e P l a i n t i f f Michael 
W i l l i a m s , based^ on t h e f o l l o w i n q f a c t s . T h a t t h e Answer t o 
P l a i n t i f f ' s C o m p l a i n t was on f i l e , r a i s i n g v a l i d d e f e n s e s t o 
P l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m . That N o t i c e of T r i a l was i n a d e q u a t e and t h a t 
Defendant d id no t r e c e i v e n o t i c e u n t i l t h e day of t r i a l , a t which 
t i m e D e f e n d a n t was o u t of town and i m m e d i a t e l y came b a c k t o 
a p p e a r i n C o u r t , b u t when D e f e n d a n t a r r i v e d t o C o u r t , he was 
a d v i s e d t h a t C o u r t had b e e n a d j o u r n e d . The D e f e n d a n t checked 
t h e C o u r t c l e r k , and was t o l d , as shown by minu te e n t r y , a copy 
of wh ich i s a t t a c h e d , t h a t t h e m a t t e r had been c o n t i n u e d s i n c e 
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P l a i n t i f f was n o t p r e s e n t and P l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y was not 
p repared . 
DATED this 3rd day of February, 1987. 
p ^ r ^ r ^ 
M. CHRIS HARRTSON, PRO SE 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE-NAMED AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ROBERT 
L. LORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a hearing on Defendant's Motion 
to Pet Aside Default Judgment has been scheduled to be heard 
before one of the Law and Motion Judges of the above entitled 
Court on the 10th day of February, 1987 at the hour of 2:00 P.M. 
or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
Please qovern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this "3rd day of February, 1987. 
I. CHRIS HARRISON, PRO SE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Ird day of February, 
1987, T hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and Notice of Hearing, to 
Robert L. Lord, attorney for Plaintiff, 444 Metropolitan Law 
Building, 411 South 100 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
^ 1 7 ^ -
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M. CHRIS HARRISON 
Pro Se 
556 4 West Jeremiah Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone: (ROD 482-4151 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
\ • ••« ' • ' III • ' • 1 '• ' • •' 
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
M. CHRIS HARRISON, 
Defendant. 
111
 • -!• ' • ' j) 1' • 
: 
i AFFIDAVIT OF 
I M. CHRIS HARRISON 
/ 
) / ) CIVIL NO. 84-CV-10295 
i / 
. . . • • • • • • I
 T 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW the Aff iant , M. Chris Harrison, Pro Se, af ter 
f i r s t being duly sworn under oath s t a t e s as fo l lows: 
1. That A f f i a n t i s a r e s i d e n t of S a l t Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
2 . That the Answer to P l a i n t i f f ' s Complaint in the 
a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r , i s on f i l e r a i s i n g v a l i d d e f e n s e s to 
P l a i n t i f f ' s claim. 
3 . That a Notice of Trial in the above e n t i t l e d matter 
was i n a d e q u a t e , and t h a t Defendant r e c e i v e d sa id n o t i c e by 
telephone from his daughter. 
4 . That A f f i a n t appeared in Court at the time of 
t r i a l , but he was advised by the clerk that no action was taken, 
and that said Trial would be rescheduled. 
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5. That Affiant checked with the clerk and found tha t 
t he P l a i n t i f f and h i s a t t o rney were not prepared to p re sen t 
evidence a t the time of t r i a l , as shown in minute entry r copy 
of which is attached to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. 
DATED t h i s ^rd day of February, 1987. 
TVfis$£-
M. CHRIS HARRISON, PRO SE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s 3rd d a y of 
F e b r u a r y , 1987. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
RESIDING AT 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
<*ML. 
Addendum n G-l n 
ROBERT L. LORD 
Utah State Bar No. 1994 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Wf Metropolitan Law Building 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4241 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, 
. . . Plaintiff, 
vs. 
M. CHRIS HARRISON, 
. . . Defendant. 
—oooOooo— 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ROBERT L. LORD, being first duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and 
says that: 
1. I am the attorney for the plaintiff in the above entitled matter and 
have personal knowlege of all matters alleged herein, except for those matters 
alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be 
true. 
2. Under date of November 20, 1986, the clerk of the court mailed a 
copy of the notice of trial to the defendant, M. Chris Harrison, at his address of 
5564 West Jeremiah Drive (the address of the defendant as contained on all 
pleadings in the file). 
3. On January 5, 1987, at the appointed time and place, I appeared on 
behalf of the plaintiff. The case was called by the Honorable Robert C. Gibson. 
No one appeared for the defendant. I then moved for default judgment based upon 
the failure of the defendant to appear for the trial. 
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 84-CV-10295 
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4. The Court denied the motion at that time and took it under 
advisement, pending citation by plaintiff of authority to grant the judgment under 
the circumstances. 
5. On January 26, 1987, I presented to the Court a memorandum in 
support of my motion, together with a proposed default judgment. 
6. After discussing the matter with me, the Court concluded that he 
would sign the judgment, which was duly entered of record by the clerk of the 
court. 
7. Under date of January 29, 1987, I mailed a copy of the notice of 
judgment to the defendant at the aforesaid address on Jeremiah Drive. 
8. On February 2, 1987, I received a telephone call from an individual 
who identified himself as M. Chris Harrison. He told me that he was late for the 
trial on January 5, having been delayed coming from out of town. He said he had 
just received my notice of judgment and told me that he was not notifed of any 
hearing on the 26th. I explained to him that there was no hearing on the 26th, but 
that that was the date upon which the judge actually signed the judgment. He 
insisted that I could not take judgment as I had done, and that I needed to present 
evidence. 
9. I have spent a total of 2.8 hours for appearance at the trial, 
research and preparation of the memorandum and preparation of this affidavit. My 
customary and reasonable charge for matters of this nature, and the amount agreed 
upon between me and the plaintiff, is the sum of $75.00 per hour, making a total 
fee incurred by my client (from and including the appearance for trial of this 
matter) of $210.00. ^^^ 
-Robert U Lord 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this date of February 4, 1987. 
NOTARY PUBT3C 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
lt//7/*7 
2 
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ROBERT L. LORD 
Utah State Bar No. 1994 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
444 Metropolitan Law Building 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-4241 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, ) 
• 
vs. 
M. CHRIS HARRISON, 
• 
. . Plaintiff, 
. . Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
—oooOooo— 
ORDER/DENYING 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT OUDGMENT 
Ctfil No. 84-CV-10295 
The defendant's motion to set aside default judgment came on regularly 
for hearing before the undersigned, one of the judges of the above entitled court, 
on the 18th day of March, 1987. Plaintiff was represented by his attorney, Robert 
L. Lord, Defendant was present in court and represented by his attorney, L. Zane 
Gill. 
The Court, having reviewed the files and records herein, having weighed 
and considered the affidavits submitted in support and opposition to the motion 
together with the representations and arguments of counsel, finding that the 
defendant had failed to use due diligence prior to the trial, and that there was no 
excusable neglect excusing him for failing to appear for the trial, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the defendant's motion be, and the same hereby is, denied. 
DATED th i s$> / day of March 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
iibson-
Circuit Court Judge 
39-M20WH-O i - _,_ _
 njn 
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L. ZANE GILL (3716), of 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephones (801) 328-1666 
IN TOE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, ) 
Plaint iff/Respondent, ) NOTICE OP APPEAL 
) TO CTEAH COURT OP APPEALS 
v. ) 
M. CHRIS HARRISON, ) Civil No. 84-CV-10295 
) Judge Gibson 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
Notice is hereby given that M. Chris Harrison, Defendant above-
named, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals from the Default 
Judgment entered on or about January 26, 1987, in the amount of two 
thousand, one hundred dollars ($2,100.00) in favor of Midiael Williams, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, against M. Chris harrison, Defendant and Appel-
lant. 
This Notice of Appeal is given pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(c) and Rule 3a of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this W day of March, 1987. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
L. Zane Gill 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herebycertify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent, this ^/6 day of July, 1986, to L. Zane Gill, attorney for defendant, 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH, 50 West Broadway, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101. 
RobCTt L. Lord 
